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Abstract 
In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often 
in a particular target print colour (e.g., “month” most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the 
participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not 
(control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully 
explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency 
instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many 
participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an 
instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency 
instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false 
instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results 
suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of 
implicit learning. 
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Learning, Awareness, and Instruction: Subjective Contingency Awareness 
Does Matter in the Colour-Word Contingency Learning Paradigm 
 For many years now, learning researchers have debated about whether the impact of 
stimulus pairings on behaviour depends on awareness of those contingencies between stimuli 
(e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; see Schmidt, 2012). Most often, the relation between both is 
examined by assessing the impact of stimulus pairings on both performance and awareness 
measures. Awareness can be assessed subjectively by asking participants to verbally report 
whether they noticed the contingencies or objectively by presenting forced-choice questions 
about the nature of the contingencies (see Cheesman & Merikle, 1986, for more on this 
distinction; see also Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995). Regardless of the type of 
awareness measure, the available evidence about the relation between learning and awareness is 
mixed. On the one hand, results from several paradigms reveal very sizeable effects of 
contingency awareness. For instance, in a meta-analysis reported by Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, and Crombez (2010) contingency awareness accounted for 37% of the 
variance in evaluative conditioning, that is, the impact of stimulus pairings on the liking of those 
stimuli. Indeed, there is still discussion about whether evaluative conditioning without 
contingency awareness is even possible (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Pleyers, 
Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012b; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009). 
Similar to these results, research on autonomic conditioning (i.e., the impact of stimulus pairings 
on autonomic reactions to those stimuli) demonstrates a large role for contingency awareness. 
Indeed, contingency awareness is generally considered to be a necessary precondition for 
autonomic conditioning (Dawson & Furedy, 1979; but see Schultz & Helmstetter, 2010). 
 On the other hand, learning in several other contingency learning paradigms seems to 
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often occur without awareness. One example of this is the colour-word contingency learning 
paradigm of Schmidt and colleagues (Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & 
Besner, 2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 
2010). In this colour identification paradigm, each of a set of neutral words is presented most 
often in a certain print colour (e.g., “month” in red, “plate” in green, etc.). It is typically found 
that participants respond faster and more accurately to high contingency trials, where the word is 
presented in its most frequent colour (e.g., “month” in red or “plate” in green), relative to low 
contingency trials, where the word is presented in a less frequent colour (e.g., “month” in green 
or “plate” in red). This effect is extremely reliable and appears almost instantly (Schmidt et al., 
2010). 
 According to Schmidt and colleagues (2010), learning in the colour-word contingency 
learning paradigm occurs as a simple result of episodic memory retrieval biases. Specifically, 
they suggest that on each trial participants encode an episode containing a record of the 
distracting word, the target colour, and the response that was made (see Logan, 1988). On 
subsequent trials, processing of the distracting word will lead participants to retrieve some of the 
episodes in which that word was presented. As most of the episodes associated with a given 
word will have the same (high contingency) response, the participant will be biased toward that 
high contingency response. For instance, if “month” is presented most often in red, then most 
“month” episodes will have a red response encoded.  Presentation of “month” will therefore bias 
a participant to make a red response. 
 Although awareness of the stimuli is likely needed to encode each episodic memory, the 
learning that occurs in the task is simply an episodic retrieval bias. Participants do not 
necessarily need to be aware of the contingencies in order for this to occur. Indeed, participants 
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of previous colour-word contingency learning experiments were not informed in advance about 
the contingencies in the task and post-experiment awareness tests suggest that most participants 
did not consciously detect them (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2007). Thus, the better performance on high 
relative to low contingency trials seems to be a case of implicit learning. Similar reports of 
learning without awareness have been found in a wide array of performance (i.e., response time) 
paradigms, such as the Eriksen flanker task (Carlson & Flowers, 1996; Miller, 1987), serial 
response time task (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999; Mayr, 1996; 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Song, Howard, & Howard, 2007; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 
1989), and hidden covariation detection tasks (Lewicki, 1985, 1986; Lewicki, Hill, & 
Czyzewska, 1992), along with other paradigms such as the Hebb digits task (McKelvie, 1987).
 Some results even suggest that paradigms such as the colour-word contingency paradigm 
are simply immune to conscious influences. For instance, Schmidt and colleagues (2007) 
compared participants at varying levels of contingency awareness and found that the size of the 
contingency effect was not dependent on the amount of contingency awareness. Specifically, 
participants were divided up into those who claimed awareness (subjectively aware), those who 
guessed well which words went with which colours (objectively aware), and those who guessed 
at or below chance (objectively unaware). All three groups showed a similarly-sized learning 
effect. Carlson and Flowers (1996, Experiment 1) similarly reported that contingency awareness 
did not increase learning in the Eriksen flanker task when flankers were presented 
simultaneously with targets. Likewise, Miller (1987, Experiment 5) found that better guessing of 
the contingencies between flanking and target letters was not associated with an increased 
contingency effect. 
 One could argue that the limited role of contingency awareness in performance tasks such 
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as the colour-word contingency paradigm is related to the concurrent presentation of the related 
distracters (e.g., a neutral word) and targets (e.g., a print color). With concurrently presented 
target and distracting stimuli, there is simply too little time to use contingency knowledge 
consciously. If, for instance, the participant can identify the colour in 550 ms, then the word 
would have to be consciously identified and used to predict a response even faster than that in 
order to speed responding. It seems implausible that this could be done so quickly in an 
intentional manner. In other words, even if a participant does become aware of the contingencies, 
there is not enough time to consciously anticipate the response associated with a given distracter 
word. Thus, contingency knowledge, even if obtained, is effectively useless. If true, this would 
mean that the colour-word contingency learning paradigm is exactly the type of paradigm mostly 
likely to be immune to conscious contingency knowledge. In line with this idea, paradigms in 
which the distracter is presented in advance of the target do often show a positive effect of 
contingency knowledge, for instance, in a flanker task where flankers were presented in advance 
of the target (Carlson & Flowers, 1996, Experiment 3) and in sequence learning (e.g., Mayr, 
1996). 
 On the other hand, concluding that conscious contingency knowledge cannot aid learning 
in tasks where the target and contingent distracter are presented simultaneously requires 
accepting the null results of only a few experiments. When considering subjective measures of 
awareness, there are at least two reasons why some previous studies may have failed to reveal a 
relation between contingency awareness and learning. First, there are reasons to believe that 
many participants who report being contingency aware are not actually aware of the 
contingencies. For instance, Bar-Anan, De Houwer, and Nosek (2010) showed that participants 
will often claim to subjective awareness when contingencies are not even present in the task. 
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Similar problems arose in studies by Schmidt and colleagues (2007): when probed for what 
contingencies “aware” participants noticed, most gave answers unrelated to contingencies (e.g., 
“I think I saw yellow a lot”). In all likelihood, these participants were not actually aware of the 
contingencies and misunderstood the question that probed for contingency awareness. Second, a 
positive relation between subjective awareness and learning might also have gone unnoticed in 
previous experiments because of floor effects in awareness. When virtually all participants are 
contingency unaware, it is impossible to detect a positive impact of contingency awareness on 
learning. 
 Moreover, even if the encoding and retrieval of episodes occurs in a largely implicit way, 
explicit knowledge of contingencies could alter how trial information is encoded. For instance, 
knowing the contingencies could lead participants to encode high contingency trials more 
strongly (i.e., because they are consistent with the contingencies that they have explicit in mind) 
and low contingency trials more weakly (i.e., because they are inconsistent). This preferential 
encoding of high contingency trials would thus lead to even stronger retrieval of the high 
contingency response. 
 Furthermore, there is some evidence that suggests that contingency awareness can be 
beneficial in contingency learning, so long as the contingencies to be learned are very simple. 
For instance, Broadbent, FitzGerald, and Broadbent (1986) used the dynamic systems task in 
which participants need to set the imaginary fee for car parks and the interval between busses to 
obtain both a certain optimal use of the car parks (i.e., not too much and not too little) and a 
certain optimal number of free spaces on the busses. Decreasing the frequency of busses both 
decreases bus use and increases parking space use, and increasing parking fees both increases 
bus use and decreases parking use. Thus, achieving both goals (parking space and bus use) 
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requires a complex interaction between the two variables that participants can manipulate 
(parking fees and bus regularity). When participants are given instructions about how to perform 
the task, the instructions are generally unhelpful. The contingencies are too complex for 
awareness to help. However, if participants are given instructions and the opportunity to practice 
how parking fees and bus regularity affect the outcomes separately (e.g., by first practicing the 
effect of parking fees on the outcomes and then practicing the effect of bus regularity on the 
outcomes), learning in the combined task is greatly improved. That is, participants are able to 
consciously learn much simpler contingencies (i.e., learning one simple contingency relation at a 
time rather than an interaction between two) in order to piece together the more complex 
problem. Thus, contingency awareness from instructions seems to aid learning if the 
contingencies to be learned are more simple. Given how simple the contingencies are in the 
colour-word contingency paradigm, it might be possible after all to observe a benefit of 
contingency awareness for implicit learning. We therefore decided to re-examine the relation 
between subjective contingency awareness and learning in the colour-word contingency learning 
task. 
Experiment 1 
 We chose to use the colour-word contingency learning task because previous results 
suggest that learning in this task is independent of awareness. Furthermore, the task is interesting 
because the associated stimuli (i.e., the word and the colour) are presented simultaneously and 
very shortly before the response. If we could demonstrate that learning in this paradigm is 
influenced by subjective contingency awareness, it would show that contingency awareness can 
matter even in situations where there is very little time to use conscious contingency knowledge 
in order to speed up performance. To avoid incorrect reporting of contingency awareness, we 
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clarified the question probing for contingency awareness by clearly explaining the type of 
contingency relationships we were asking about (see Methods). To avoid floor effects, we also 
took measures to increase the number of participants who became aware of the contingencies. 
More specifically, we increased the strength of the contingencies (i.e., 80% rather than 50% trials 
in which a word was presented in its assigned colour). Moreover, we warned half of the 
participants before the start of the task that words would be printed more often in a specific 
colour and gave them the specific pairings. By highlighting the contingencies in this manner, we 
hoped to increase the number of contingency-aware participants. To avoid a situation in which 
all participants are contingency aware, half of the participants were not informed about the 
colour-word contingencies. Finally, in addition to registering subjective awareness, we also 
assessed objective contingency awareness following the main learning task. 
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-two Ghent University undergraduates participated in Experiment 1 in 
exchange for €4. As was the case in all other experiments, all participants were native Dutch 
speakers. 
 Apparatus. Stimulus and response timing were controlled by E-Prime software 
(Psychology Software Tools, 2002). Using an AZERTY keyboard, participants pressed the “J” 
key for red, the “K” key for yellow, and the “L” key for green. 
 Materials and Design. Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the screen. In this 
experiment, three neutral five-letter Dutch words (onder [under], maand [month], plaat [plate]) 
were presented in three different print colours (red, yellow, green). Each word was presented 
most often in one colour. For instance, “onder” might have been presented 80% of the time in 
red, “maand” 80% of the time in yellow, and “plaat” 80% of the time in green. Which word went 
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with which colour was randomly determined for each participant. Words were presented equally 
often in the other two colours. Words were presented in bold, 18 pt. Courier New font on a black 
background. The RGB values for the display colours were 255,0,0 (red), 255,255,0 (yellow), and 
0,255,0 (green). Participants saw a total of 300 trials selected at random with replacement (i.e., 
after a trial was presented it was not removed from the list of possible future trials). 
 Procedure. Participants were first given the instruction that they would be responding to 
the print colour of words. Participants in the instructed group received the following second 
instruction screen telling them of the word-colour contingencies involved in the task (English 
translation): 
Note: Each word in the experiment is presented most often in a certain colour. 
Specifically, the word “month” is presented most often in red, the word “under” is 
presented most often in yellow, and the word “plate” is presented most often in green. 
Remember these color-word relationships as you perform the task. 
Note that this is a sample word-colour mapping. Which word was presented with which colour 
was randomly determined for each participant. Participants in the control group were not 
presented with this second instruction screen. On each trial in the task, participants first saw a 
white fixation “+” for 150 ms, followed by a blank screen for 150 ms, followed by the coloured 
word for 2000 ms or until a response was made. After a response was made, the next trial started 
if the participant’s response was correct. If the participant responded incorrectly or failed to 
respond in 2000 ms, “XXX” in white was presented for 500 ms before the next trial. Following 
the main procedure, participants were presented with the following subjective awareness 
question telling them that each word was presented most often in a certain colour and asking 
them if they noticed these relationships (English translation): 
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In this experiment, each word was presented most often in a certain colour. Specifically, 
one word was presented most often in red, one word was presented most often in yellow, 
and one word was presented most often in green. Did you notice these relationships? 
Note that the second of the three sentences was added to increase clarity. Following this, 
participants were probed for objective awareness with three forced choice questions. On each of 
these questions, the participant was presented with one of the three display words in white and 
was asked to guess which colour it was presented in most often (i.e., three-alternative forced 
choice). Thus, objective awareness was a scale variable on which 0, 33, 67, and 100% were the 
only possible values for a given participant. 
Results 
 In this and the following experiments mean correct response latencies and percentage 
error data were analyzed. Trials on which participants failed to respond (less than 1% of the data) 
were removed from analyses. 
 Instruction. The response latency and error data for the two instruction groups are 
presented in Figure 1. Overall, participants responded significantly faster to high (533 ms) 
relative to low contingency trials (572 ms), t(61) = 7.621, SEdiff = 5, p < .001,  = .49, and also 
with less errors (4.3 and 9.4%, respectively), t(61) = 6.528, SEdiff = .8, p < .001,  = .41. Most 
importantly, the size of the contingency effect (low – high contingency) was significantly larger 
in the instructed group in errors, t(61) = 2.450, SEdiff = 1.5, p = .017,  = .09, and marginal in 
response latencies, t(61) = 1.793, SEdiff = 10, p = .078,  = .05. Planned comparisons revealed 
that the contingency effect was significant for instructed participants in response latencies (high: 
525 ms; low: 573 ms), t(30) = 6.327, SEdiff = 8, p < .001,  = .57, and errors (high: 4.6%; low: 
11.5%), t(30) = 5.800, SEdiff = 1.2, p < .001,  = .53. The contingency effect was also significant 
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for control participants in response latencies (high: 541 ms; low: 571 ms), t(30) = 4.546, SEdiff = 
7, p < .001,  = .41, and errors (high: 4.0%; low: 7.2%), t(30) = 3.590, SEdiff = .9, p = .001,  = 
.30. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 Subjective awareness. A total of 84% (26 of 31) of participants in the instructed group 
and 52% (16 of 31) of the participants in the control group said that they were aware of the 
presence of color-word contingencies. The difference in rates of subjective awareness in the two 
groups was statistically significant, t(60) = 2.847, SEdiff = 11, p = .006,  = .12. Technically, 
100% of participants should have been subjectively aware in the instructed group, perhaps 
indicating that the five that said they were not aware did not read the instructions (particularly 
given the fact that the subjective awareness question was almost verbatim identical to the 
contingency instruction; see Methods). The response latency and percentage error data are 
presented in Figure 2. Importantly, subjective awareness did matter in this experiment, as 
subjectively aware participants showed a larger contingency effect (low minus high contingency 
trials) than subjectively unaware participants in response times, t(60) = 2.336, SEdiff = 11, p = 
.023,  = .08, and in errors, t(60) = 3.928, SEdiff = 1.5, p < .001,  = .20. The data of 
subjectively aware and unaware participants were then analysed separately. Subjectively-aware 
participants produced a significant contingency effect in response times, t(41) = 7.305, SEdiff = 6, 
p < .001,  = .57, and errors, t(41) = 7.490, SEdiff = .9, p < .001,  = .58. Importantly, 
subjectively-unaware participants also produced a significant contingency effect in response 
times, t(19) = 3.101, SEdiff = 7, p = .006,  = .34, though not in errors, t(19) = 1.181, SEdiff = .9, 
p = .252,  = .07. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
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 Mediation. Because the instruction manipulation increases subjective awareness and 
subjective awareness is predictive of the size of the contingency effect it could be the case that 
the effect of instructions on the contingency effect is indirectly due the associated increases in 
contingency awareness (i.e., mediation). To test this, we first combined response latency and 
error effects (low contingency – high contingency) by calculating the principle component of the 
two and ran a series of regressions. Note that this principle component is simply a measure of the 
contingency effect that combines what the response latency and error effects have in common.1 
Instruction group significantly correlated with subjective awareness, β = .345, p = .006, and with 
the contingency effect, β = .309, p = .014. However, when awareness and group were added into 
a regression together as predictors and the contingency effect as the dependent variable, only 
awareness correlated significantly with the contingency effect, β = .373, rY(1.2) = .368, p = .004. 
Group and the contingency effect did not correlate significantly in this analysis, β  = .181, rY(1.2) 
= .188, p = .164. A Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) confirmed significant mediation, Z = 
2.024, SE = .126, p = .043. Thus, the effect of instruction group on the contingency effect is 
mediated by contingency awareness. Furthermore, the non-significant semipartial correlation for 
group suggests that group is fully (or at least primarily) mediated by contingency awareness. 
 Objective awareness. Participants in the instructed group also scored significantly 
higher on the objective awareness task (98%) than participants in the control group (86%), t(60) 
= 2.142, SEdiff = 6, p = .036,  = .07. Guessing in the objective awareness test was well above 
chance (i.e., 33%) in both the instructed, t(30) = 29.846, SEdiff = 2, p < .001,  = .97, and control 
participants, t(30) = 10.355, SEdiff = 5, p < .001,  = .78. Unlike subjective awareness, objective 
awareness was not related to the size of the contingency effect in response times, r(60) = -.004, p 
= .978, or in errors, r(60) = .121, p = .349. Interestingly, subjective and objective awareness did 
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not correlate, r(60) = .008, p = .949. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that contingency learning effects in the colour-word 
contingency learning paradigm do benefit from subjective contingency awareness. Subjectively 
aware participants showed larger contingency effects in both response times and errors relative 
to subjectively unaware participants. Objective awareness, in contrast, did not seem to matter, as 
objective awareness was uncorrelated with the size of the learning effect. Regarding this latter 
result, however, it is worth noting that performance in the objective awareness test was near 
ceiling, which may be concealing any effect that might exist. We will discuss this in further 
detail in the General Discussion. 
Experiment 2 
 The results of Experiment 1 leave open the question of how subjective contingency 
knowledge benefits performance in learning tasks such as the colour-word contingency learning 
paradigm. One possibility is that contingency knowledge has a direct effect on learning. That is, 
the explicit representation of contingency knowledge in memory helps to directly activate the 
expected response. If this were the case, then explicit knowledge of the contingency relations 
should be sufficient to produce a contingency learning effect, even if implicit learning is 
impossible. This seems a plausible outcome. In autonomic conditioning research, it has been 
shown that merely instructing participants that a green light indicates an increased likelihood of a 
shock (even though it does not) results in participants having a galvanic skin response to the light 
(i.e., fear conditioning; Cook & Morris, 1937). However, the autonomic conditioning paradigm 
is quite different than our own, so it is not clear whether similar results will be obtained. To this 
end, participants in Experiment 2 received contingency instructions identical to those presented 
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to participants in the instructed group of Experiment 1, but no contingencies were actually 
present in the task. That is, although participants were told which words would be (supposedly) 
presented most often in which colours, in reality all words were presented equally often in the 
three colours. 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-three Ghent University undergraduates participated in Experiment 2 
in exchange for €4. 
 Apparatus. The apparatus for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 Materials and Design. The materials and design of Experiment 2 were identical to 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. Words were presented equally often in all colours. 
Thus, “high contingency” and “low contingency” trials were defined by the (false) contingency 
instructions given at the start of the experiment and not by real contingencies. Which word was 
assigned to which colour in the instructions was still randomly determined for each participant. 
Participants were presented with 180 trials selected at random with replacement. 
 Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for participants in the 
instructed group of Experiment 1. 
Results 
 Overall. Participants in Experiment 2 did not respond differently to high (565 ms) 
relative to low contingency (567 ms) trials in response times, t(52) = .715, SEdiff = 4, p = .478,  
< .01, or in errors (4.9 and 5.1%, respectively), t(52) = .422, SEdiff = .4, p = .675,  < .01. 
Hence, we found no evidence for an instructed contingency effect. 
 Subjective awareness. A total of 34% (18 of 53) of participants said that they were 
aware of the presence of color-word contingencies. Of course, no such contingencies were 
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actually present. Importantly, subjective awareness did not matter in this experiment, as there 
was no difference between subjectively aware and unaware participants in the size of the 
contingency effect (low minus high contingency trials) in response times, t(51) = .170, SEdiff = 8, 
p = .865,  < .01, or in errors, t(51) = .389, SEdiff = .4, p = .699,  < .01. 
 Objective awareness. Due to a programming error, the first four participants did not 
have objective awareness data. For the remaining participants, objective awareness of the 
(instructed) contingencies was high (65%). This guessing was well above chance (i.e., 33%), 
t(48) = 6.235, SEdiff = 5, p < .001,  = .45, indicating that participants as a whole had good 
memory of the instructed contingency relationships. However, objective awareness was again 
not related to the size of the contingency effect in response times, r(47) = -.004, p = .976, or in 
errors, r(47) = -.129, p = .376. Subjective and objective awareness were again uncorrelated, r(47) 
= .045, p = .760. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 demonstrated that subjective contingency knowledge, at least in the current 
paradigm, has no direct effect on the size of the contingency effect. Even though a large number 
of participants claimed that they were aware of the (non-existent) contingency relationships 
when asked and even though objective awareness measures indicated good memory for the 
instructed contingency relationships, no contingency learning effect was observed. Furthermore, 
both subjective and objective awareness were unrelated to the size of the contingency effect. 
Thus, it appears that having conscious knowledge about contingency relationships is not 
sufficient to produce a contingency effect. It seems as if an actual contingency needs to be 
experienced in order for the contingency to influence behavior in the present paradigm. 
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Experiment 3 
 If conscious contingency knowledge does nothing to produce a contingency learning 
effect directly, then what does it do? An alternative interpretation is that contingency knowledge 
serves to guide attention to the predictive dimension (in this case, the word). That is, if 
participants know that the word is predictive of the response, then they may attend more to the 
identity of the word in order to boost performance. This greater attention to the word will lead to 
both greater contingency awareness and stronger learning effects. In Experiment 2, this increased 
attention to the word would not have helped, because contingencies were not present. In 
Experiment 3, we tested the attention account by giving half of the participants false contingency 
instruction. Specifically, real contingencies were present, but the instructions told participants of 
different pairings than those that actually existed. For instance, a participant may have been told 
that “month” was presented most often in yellow, when it was actually presented most often in 
red. If contingency instruction only has a beneficial effect on performance by increasing 
attention to the word and thus causing stronger implicit learning, then these incorrect instructions 
should improve a participant’s learning of the correct contingencies. The other half of 
participants did not receive this instruction, similar to the control group in Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty Ghent University undergraduates participated in Experiment 3 in 
exchange for €4. 
 Apparatus. The apparatus of Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 Materials and Design. The materials and design of Experiment 3 were identical to 
Experiment 1 with the exception that there were only 180 trials selected at random with 
replacement. 
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 Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1 with the 
exception that the instructions given to participants in the instruction group were incorrect. That 
is, the word-colour relationships participants were told were not the correct word-colour 
relationships. High and low contingency trials were defined relative to the actual contingencies, 
not the instructed ones. This was also true for the objective awareness data: awareness of the 
actual contingencies was measured. 
Results 
 Instruction. The response latency and error data for the two instruction groups are 
presented in Figure 3. Overall, participants responded significantly faster to high (542 ms) 
relative to low contingency trials (579 ms), t(49) = 5.762, SEdiff = 6, p < .001,  = .40, and also 
with less errors (4.3 and 7.0%, respectively), t(49) = 4.051, SEdiff = .7, p < .001,  = .25. 
Critically and contrary to our hypothesis, the size of the contingency effect was significantly 
smaller in the instructed group in response times, t(48) = 2.141, SEdiff = 12, p = .037,  = .09. 
Though numerically in the same direction, this difference was not significant in the errors, t(48) 
= .208, SEdiff = .3, p = .836,  < .01. Planned comparisons revealed that the contingency effect 
was significant for instructed participants in response latencies (high: 553 ms; low: 576 ms), 
t(24) = 3.147, SEdiff = 7, p = .004,  = .29, and errors (high: 4.4%; low: 6.9%), t(24) = 3.216, 
SEdiff = .8, p = .004,  = .30. The contingency effect was also significant for control participants 
in response latencies (high: 532 ms; low: 581 ms), t(24) = 5.109, SEdiff = 10, p < .001,  = .52, 
and errors (high: 4.2%; low: 7.0%), t(24) = 2.616, SEdiff = 1.1, p = .015,  = .22. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 Subjective awareness. A total of 60% (15 of 25) of participants in the instructed group 
and 64% (16 of 25) of the participants in the control group said that they were aware of the 
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presence of color-word contingencies. This one-participant difference was not statistically 
different, t(48) = .286, SEdiff = 14, p = .776,  < .01. It is interesting that instructed participants 
scored so low on the subjective awareness test, given that the instructions and awareness 
question were near identical (see Experiment 1 Methods). However, the instructed contingencies 
did not match the real contingencies, a point which we will return to in the General Discussion. 
The response latency and percentage error data are presented in Figure 4. Subjectively-aware 
participants did not show a significantly larger contingency effect (44 ms) than subjectively-
unaware participants (25 ms) in response times, t(48) = 1.454, SEdiff = 19, p = .153,  < .01, or 
in errors (3.1% and 2.0%, respectively), t(48) = .757, SEdiff = 1.0, p = .453,  = .01, though both 
numerical differences were suggestive and consistent in direction with Experiment 1. 
Subjectively aware and unaware participants were then analysed separately. Subjectively aware 
participants produced a significant contingency effect in response times, t(30) = 5.410, SEdiff = 8, 
p < .001,  = .49, and errors, t(30) = 3.475, SEdiff = .9, p = .002,  = .29. Importantly, 
subjectively unaware participants also produced a significant contingency effect in response 
times, t(18) = 2.505, SEdiff = 10, p = .022,  = .26, and a marginal effect in errors, t(18) = 2.068, 
SEdiff = 1.0, p = .053,  = .19. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 Objective awareness. Participants in the instructed and control groups both scored 88% 
on the objective awareness task (actual, not instructed contingencies) and did not differ 
statistically from one another, t(48) = .006, SEdiff = 7, p = .995,  < .01. Guessing in the 
objective awareness test was well above chance (i.e., 33%) in both the instructed, t(24) = 11.684, 
SEdiff = 5, p < .001,  = .85, and control participants, t(24) = 10.845, SEdiff = 5, p < .001,  = 
.83. Objective awareness was marginally correlated with the size of the contingency effect in 
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response times, r(48) = .239, p = .094, but not in errors, r(48) = .213, p = .137. Subjective and 
objective awareness again did not correlate, r(48) = .125, p = .387. It is again possible, however, 
that ceiling effects may have reduced these correlations. 
Discussion 
 We thought that contingency instruction might only serve to guide attention to the 
predictive word rather than to increase learning in any direct way. However, learning was 
actually decreased in the false instruction condition, rather than increased. Although it may 
additionally be the case that the false instructions did increase attention to the word, it is clear 
that learning was impaired. This may mean that contingency knowledge does play some active 
role in learning that goes beyond merely directing attention to stimuli. 
Reanalysis 1 
 In Experiment 3, we thought that giving participants false contingency information would 
lead to more attention to the word and thus larger contingency effects. Disconfirming this 
hypothesis, the exact reverse was observed. Reanalysis 1 aimed to test a possible interpretation 
of the reduced contingency effect for falsely-instructed participants. Specifically, in the analyses 
already reported in Experiment 3 we assessed the difference between the actual high and low 
contingency trials (i.e., as defined by the pairings), rather than those we instructed. It could be 
the case that participants in the false instruction group partially learned the instructed 
contingencies in addition to the actual ones. Indeed, participants may have even been faster and 
more accurate on trials consistent with the instructions rather than the actual contingencies. Half 
of the low contingency trials corresponded to the instructed contingencies and half did not. Such 
a result would indicate that instructions alone can lead to contingency effects. It could also 
explain why the contingency effect was smaller in the instructed group than in the control group 
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of Experiment 3. If performance is better on low contingency trials that are in line with the 
instructions than on other low contingency trials, this would reduce the difference between 
overall performance on the high contingency trials and overall performance on low contingency 
trials. Thus, in Reanalysis 1 we took a second look at the data of instructed participants from 
Experiment 3 and considered three types of trials: (1) high contingency trials, (2) instructed 
contingency trials, and (3) low contingency trials. High contingency trials were those defined by 
the actual contingencies between words and colours (i.e., frequent trials). Instructed contingency 
trials were the low contingency trials that were consistent with the (false) instructions. Low 
contingency trials in this reanalysis were the remaining low contingency trials. Unless indicated 
otherwise, only participants in the false instruction group of Experiment 3 were included in the 
analyses because they were the only participants for whom instructed contingency trials could be 
identified. 
Results 
 Response latencies. The response latency data are presented in Figure 5a. Planned 
comparisons revealed that high contingency trials (553 ms) were responded to faster than 
instructed contingency trials (577 ms), t(24) = 3.247, SEdiff = 7, p = .003,  = .31. More 
critically, there was no difference in response latencies between instructed contingency trials and 
low contingency trials (572 ms), t(24) = .392, SEdiff = 12, p = .699,  < .01. Furthermore, the 19 
ms difference between high contingency and (non-instructed) low contingency trials for 
instructed participants was still marginally smaller than the 49 ms difference between high and 
low contingency trials for control participants, t(48) = 2.000, SEdiff = 15, p = .051,  = .08. Thus, 
the response latency data suggest that the decreased contingency effect for instructed relative to 
control participants is not due to a benefit for instructed contingency trials in the instructed 
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group. 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 Errors. Although the error effect was not significant in Experiment 3, we nevertheless 
opted to also assess errors on the three trial types. The error data are presented in Figure 5b. 
Although numerically in the same direction as the response latencies, there was no significant 
difference between high (4.4%) and instructed contingency trials (5.2%), t(24) = 1.135, SEdiff = 
.8, p = .268,  = .05. Interestingly, instructed contingency trials produced less errors than low 
contingency trials (8.8%), t(24) = 2.164, SEdiff = 1.6, p = .041,  = .16. Thus, unlike the 
response latencies, the error data provide some evidence that participants are (at least partially) 
biased toward the falsely-instructed contingencies. 
Discussion 
 Reanalysis 1 aimed to explore whether the smaller contingency effect in the false 
instruction group could be attributed to a benefit for those low contingency trials that were 
consistent with the false instructions. The significant difference in response latencies between 
control and instructed participants could not be explained this way, because instructed 
contingency trials showed no advantage over low contingency trials. However, an analysis on the 
errors did reveal that participants were less error-prone in the instructed contingency condition 
relative to the low contingency condition. This final result suggests that participants did have 
some bias toward the instructed response, potentially explaining why learning was impaired. 
This does contrast with the results of Experiment 2, where instructions did not bias participants 
toward the instructed response. We will return to this point in the General Discussion. 
Reanalysis 2 
 Reanalysis 2 aimed to look at the time course of learning in our experiments. Although 
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our past reports have suggested that learning is quite quick and stable (Schmidt et al., 2007, 
2010), there are some reasons to suspect a different pattern in the current report. In particular, 
instructed participants in Experiments 2 and 3 were given faulty information. It is thus possible, 
for instance, that participants in Experiment 2 initially produced an instructed contingency effect, 
but then rapidly learned that no contingencies were present and stopped producing the instructed 
contingency effect. If so, an initially present instructed contingency effect may have simply been 
lost in the averaging of responses across the whole experiment. Similarly, falsely instructed 
participants in Experiment 3 might have initially started responding consistent with the instructed 
contingencies, resulting in very poor performance at first, followed by better learning later on as 
they discovered the actual contingencies. Thus, the smaller effect for falsely instructed 
participants could be due solely to poor early performance. 
 For each of the three experiments, we therefore calculated high and low contingency 
trials for each block of 30 trials. This led to ten blocks of 30 trials in Experiment 1 and six blocks 
of 30 trials in Experiments 2 and 3. Particularly in Experiments 2 and 3, we might expect that 
any changes in the size of the contingency effect for incorrectly instructed participants might 
occur early on. As a result, we tested for two types of contrasts: (1) a linear trend to capture a 
potential change over time from the start till the end of the experiment, and (2) a deviation 
contrast comparing the first block to the mean of the rest, in order to capture a potential sudden 
shift in performance from the first few trials to the rest of the experiment. For each of our three 
experiments, we thus tested for both linear and deviation trends of block. Errors were too 
infrequent to be analysed in such small blocks, so only response latencies are reported.2 
Results 
 Experiment 1. The time series data for Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 6a. The 
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difference in the learning effect between instructed and control participants in Experiment 1 was 
not related to block linearly, F(1, 60) = .606, MSE = 8788, p = .439,  < .01, indicating that the 
difference between groups did not grow or shrink with time. The deviation contrast was also not 
significant, F(1, 60) = .314, MSE = 14252, p = .577,  < .01, indicating that the group 
difference in the first block was similar to the remaining blocks. Although the data are noisy, it 
appears that the instruction effect appears early and remains stable throughout the experiment. 
(Figure 6 about here) 
 Experiment 2. The time series data for Experiment 2 are presented in Figure 6b. The 
learning effect in Experiment 2 was not related to block linearly, F(1, 52) = .103, MSE = 4525, p 
= .749,  < .01, indicating that the learning effect did not grow or shrink with time. The 
deviation contrast was also not significant, F(1, 52) = .429, MSE = 6914, p = .515,  < .01, 
indicating no difference in the learning effect in the first block relative to the mean of the rest. 
Thus, there was no evidence of an early instructed contingency effect. 
  Experiment 3. The time series data for Experiment 3 are presented in Figure 6c. Two 
participants from the control group had to be excluded due to empty cells. The difference in the 
learning effect between falsely instructed and control participants in Experiment 3 was not 
related to block linearly, F(1, 46) = .501, MSE = 12692, p = .483,  = .01, indicating that the 
difference between groups did not grow or shrink with time. The deviation contrast was also not 
significant, F(1, 46) = .623, MSE = 16219, p = .430,  = .01, indicating that the group 
difference in the first block was similar to the remaining blocks. Indeed, the numerical difference 
is in the opposite direction that one would expect. Like the previous experiments, there appears 
to be no differential effect of the instructions over time. 
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Discussion 
 Interestingly, no evidence for block effects was found in any of the three experiments. 
Though chopping the data up into such small blocks made for understandably noisy data, no 
apparent systematic changes were evident. Thus, the effect of the instruction type appears to be 
immediate and stable. The immediate effects of contingency learning is consistent with past 
reports with this paradigm that have revealed learning as early as the first 16 trials (Schmidt et 
al., 2010; see also, Schmidt et al., 2007). What is particularly interesting about the lack of block 
effects in the current report is that explicit instructions had a very immediate effect with no 
apparent changes over time. One might have predicted, for instance, that an instructed 
contingency effect would have been observed early on in Experiment 2 that disappeared with 
more learning of the actual (null) contingencies. This was simply not the case, however. 
General Discussion 
 The primary aim of the present work was to further investigate the relation between 
contingency learning and contingency awareness using the colour-word contingency learning 
paradigm. While some past reports have suggested that learning in the colour-word contingency 
paradigm (and the related flanker contingency paradigm) is not influenced by conscious 
contingency knowledge (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2007), we pointed out that participants who identify 
as being subjectively aware might often not actually be contingency aware. We therefore used a 
more carefully worded subjective awareness question to reduce participant confusion. Also, we 
avoided floor effects in awareness by using stronger contingencies and instructing some 
participants about the colour-word contingencies. With 84% subjective awareness in the 
instruction group and 52% in the control group of Experiment 1, it seems this manipulation was 
successful. These changes were sufficient to reveal significant effects of subjective contingency 
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awareness. Thus, while high levels of contingency awareness are not typically observed in color-
word contingency learning studies, when participants do have subjective contingency knowledge 
it does seem to have a positive effect on colour-word contingency learning. 
 This result provides important new information about the relation between contingency 
awareness and learning in general because it shows that contingency awareness can matter even 
in performance tasks in which it is unlikely that participants use conscious knowledge of the 
contingencies in an intentional manner. In the present task, the contingent distracter is presented 
simultaneously with the target. Because participants respond on average in about 550 ms, this 
means that participants have less than 550 ms to process the distracter and to determine the likely 
response based on the distracter-target contingencies. It is unlikely that participants can engage 
in these processes intentionally during this short period of time. Nevertheless, subjective 
awareness of the contingencies does seem to facilitate these processes. Furthermore, these results 
show how rapidly contingency knowledge can exert an impact on responding. 
 Although our results shed new light on the relation between contingency awareness and 
learning, it is important to highlight the fact that subjectively unaware participants did still show 
a contingency effect in Experiments 1 and 3 and that objective awareness was again found to be 
unrelated to the size of the contingency effect (though ceiling effects were a possibility). Thus, 
our results do not contradict the notion that contingencies can be learned implicitly. Instead, they 
merely show that subjective awareness can increase the size of the observed learning effect even 
in performance paradigms such as the colour-word contingency learning paradigm. 
 Objective contingency awareness did not correlate with learning. Although this null 
correlation has been observed elsewhere (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 
2012b), we feel this results should be interpreted with caution. In Experiments 1 and 3 (i.e., the 
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experiments in which an objective contingency was present), overall objective awareness was 
quite high (i.e., near ceiling). When objective awareness is so high, there is too little variability 
in the measure (i.e., most participants got all three questions correct) to allow a correlation with 
any variable. Indeed, objective awareness did not even correlate with subjective awareness. The 
only thing objective awareness was related to was instruction group. That is, it was higher in the 
instructed relative to control participants in Experiment 1. 
 Whereas the objective awareness index is designed to capture beliefs about specific 
contingencies, the subjective awareness question tries to capture beliefs about whether 
contingencies in general were present in the task. The fact that subjective awareness was higher 
in the instructed group than in the control group of Experiment 1 thus suggests that contingency 
instructions led to an increase in conscious acceptance of the presence of contingencies which 
led to an increase in the size of the contingency effect. From this perspective, the data of 
Experiment 2 indicate that some participants were fooled into accepting the instructions as 
factual. The interpretation of the subjective awareness data of Experiment 3 is more complicated. 
The subjective awareness question asked participants if they believed that contingencies were 
present. On the one hand, contingencies were present. On the other hand, the contingencies that 
we told instructed participants were not present. Thus, for an instructed participant belief in the 
presence of contingencies and belief in the presence of the instructed contingencies were in 
conflict. This raises the possibility that “subjectively aware” participants in the falsely instructed 
group were a mix of truly aware and deceived participants. Furthermore, some “subjectively 
unaware” instructed participants may have been aware of the actual contingencies, but also 
aware of the fact that the instructions were wrong. Thus, while the contrast between instructed 
and control participants in Experiment 3 is informative, the comparison of aware versus unaware 
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participants warrants caution in this one experiment. Overall, the subjective awareness data of all 
three experiments suggest that an influence of contingency knowledge on learning, at least in the 
present paradigm, only occurs when a participant has meta knowledge (i.e., is subjectively 
aware) of the contingencies. 
 Our experiments not only provide new information about the relation between 
contingency awareness and learning, they also shed new light on the question of whether 
contingency information that is given at the outset of the experiment influences learning. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated a clear effect of contingency instructions on performance, with a 
60% larger effect in response times and 116% larger effect in the errors of instructed participants 
relative to controls. Further analyses demonstrated that instruction group had no effect on 
performance independent of that attributed to changes in subjective contingency awareness. This 
might indicate full mediation, though it is possible that a direct effect of instruction group on 
performance exists, but simply was not significant in our data. At least primarily, it seems that 
contingency instruction leads to subjective contingency awareness which then leads to a larger 
contingency effect. Other research has shown positive effects of contingency instruction (usually 
via “rule” instructions; e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980; 
Strangman, Heindel, Anderson, & Sutton, 2005). Future work is warranted, but our results 
suggest that the increase in subjective awareness obtained with these sorts of instructional 
manipulations is what increases learning. 
 Instructed contingencies do not seem to have a direct effect on learning in this paradigm. 
In Experiment 2, participants were instructed about contingencies that were not actually present 
in the task. Although many participants claimed that they were aware of the contingencies and 
objective guessing of the contingencies matched quite strongly with the instructed contingencies, 
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no instructed contingency effect was observed. This reinforces the intuitive notion that the 
crucial events on trials occur too quickly for explicit contingency knowledge to be used in an 
intentional way. 
 The results of Experiment 2 further led us to the notion that contingency awareness might 
only benefit performance by leading participants to attend more to the predictive dimension (i.e., 
the word). Indeed, some work (e.g., Jiménez & Méndez, 1999) has suggested that contingency 
learning is dependent on attention to the predictive dimension, so it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that explicit contingency knowledge (whether instructed or acquired during the task) can 
lead to increased attention to the word and thus an increase effect. Based on this idea, we thought 
that giving participants false contingency instructions in Experiment 3 would actually benefit 
performance. Though the instructed contingencies were wrong, it seemed possible that the 
presence of the instructions would lead participants to more actively look for the contingencies. 
However, this prediction was wrong. Instructed participants had a significantly smaller 
contingency effect than controls. 
 The combined results thus suggest that conscious contingency information serves a 
moderating role on implicit learning: when it matches the actual contingencies implicit learning 
is improved (Experiment 1), but when it mismatches the actual contingencies learning is 
impaired (Experiment 3). This fits well with the episodic account of contingency effects 
discussed by Schmidt and colleagues (Schmidt et al., 2010). According to this account, 
information about the distracting word, target colour, and response given are encoded into an 
episode for each trial (see Logan, 1988). On subsequent presentations of a word, associated 
episodes are retrieved from memory, leading to a strong bias toward the high contingency 
response (i.e., because most episodes of a given word will be associated with the high 
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contingency response).  Instructed contingencies could be thought of as very strongly encoded 
episodes. That is, when participants initially memorize the contingencies when given the 
instructions they make highly accessible episodes linking words to their high contingency 
responses. Though these episodes might not be enough to produce a contingency effect on their 
own (Experiment 2), they may be sufficiently strong to positively (Experiment 1) or negatively 
(Experiment 3) influence the episodic retrieval bias for the high contingency response. 
 Such episodic traces could have numerous effects on learning. For instance, in 
Experiment 1 explicit maintenance of correctly-instructed contingency relationships in memory 
could lead to faster and more reliable implicit retrieval of high contingency responses. Relatedly, 
explicit processing of stimulus pairs for contingency information could lead to changes in the 
encoding of trial information. That is, with correct instructions high contingency trials are 
encoded more strongly as they are consistent with the instructed contingencies, whereas low 
contingency trials are encoded more weakly as they are inconsistent with the instructed 
contingencies. As a result, high contingency episodes will be more accessible than low 
contingency traces, thus leading to stronger episodic memory retrieval for high contingency 
trials. 
 This will, of course, backfire when the instructed contingencies are inconsistent with the 
real contingencies. The instructed contingency trials will be encoded more strongly and the 
actual high contingency trials less strongly. High contingency trials will still bias the high 
contingency response (i.e., because of the implicit learning of the real contingencies), but the 
effect will be diluted due to the encoding bias for the wrong (instructed contingency) trials. This 
explains why the falsely instructed participants did worse than the controls in Experiment 3. The 
results of Reanalysis 1 provide some support for this episodic account. Instructed contingency 
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trials generated less errors than low contingency trials. Though this effect was only present in the 
errors, it suggests that participants did have some bias toward the instructed contingency 
response, thus weakening the benefit for actual high contingency trials. 
 However, there was no effect of instructions in Experiment 2. This may have to do with 
the lack of real contingencies in the experiment. When actual contingencies are present 
(Experiments 1 and 3), correct or false explicit knowledge may be sufficient to, respectively, 
increase or decrease the retrieval bias toward the (actual) high contingency response (and, in 
Experiment 3, decrease the bias against the instructed contingency response). However, when no 
actual contingencies are present (Experiment 2), the incorrect contingency instructions might still 
bias encoding of trials that are consistent with the instructions, but this on its own may not 
generate enough of a retrieval bias for the system to determine an expected response (i.e., the 
retrieval drift toward the instructed contingency response is not strong enough to exceed the 
appropriate retrieval threshold). This explains why no instructed contingency effect is present in 
Experiment 2. In summary, there are multiple means by which subjective contingency awareness 
may influence contingency learning effects. 
 A skeptic might argue that an alternative account of the results of Experiments 2 and 3 is 
that participants began the task in accordance with the instructions, but then eventually 
discovered that the information given to them was wrong and shifted their strategy. In particular, 
in Experiment 2 participants would start out using the contingencies to predict responses, but 
then quickly stop this when it was discovered that the contingencies were not there. Similarly, in 
Experiment 3 participants would start the task in accordance with the false instructions, only to 
discover that the instructions were wrong and slowly switch to the correct contingencies (or stop 
attending to the word). However, the block analyses in Reanalysis 2 do not support this sort of 
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alternative account. The differences between groups did not seem to change across blocks. The 
episodic account, however, fairs well with these rapid effects. If the performance advantage for 
high contingency trials is due to episodic storage and retrieval processes, then the effect of 
instructions on said encoding and retrieval processes will be present from the outset of the 
experiment. This is because the learning rate seems to be extremely fast (Schmidt et al., 2010), 
with learning effects being driven by only a few of the most recently experienced trials. Thus, the 
encoding biases due to contingency awareness does not require an aggregation over a large 
number of trials. Instead, it will be evident immediately. 
 It is worth reiterating that our finding of an effect of awareness on the learning effect is 
inconsistent with the findings of Carlson and Flowers (1996; see also, Miller, 1987) using the 
flanker paradigm. Contingency awareness, measured subjectively, did not increase learning 
effects when flankers were presented concurrently with the target. Although Type II error is a 
possibility, it is also notable that their subjective awareness measure was likely equally 
problematic as the one used by Schmidt and colleagues (2007). Alternatively, it could be the case 
that there are inherent differences between the colour-word and flanker tasks contributing to this 
difference. For instance, distracting words probably have a processing advantage over target 
print colours in our task, whereas flanking symbols (#, *, and @) probably do not have a 
processing advantage over the target letters and digits used by Carlson and Flowers. This may 
explain why conscious contingency knowledge was ineffective in their paradigm but not ours, 
because it could be that words are processed fast enough to impact colour processing, but 
symbols are not processed fast enough to impact letter/digit processing. Furthermore, it could be 
the case that the large number of target stimuli used in their flanker task (viz., 9 letters plus 9 
digits for a total of 18 target stimuli) made for too many flanker-target relationships to keep track 
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of. Further research with these two paradigms might thus prove revealing. 
 Indeed, the experiment of Broadbent and colleagues (1986) discussed in the introduction 
suggests that contingency awareness is only beneficial when learning simpler contingencies. It 
seems that explicit knowledge is only useful when it is simple enough to keep track of in 
(limited-capacity) memory. Future work might thus aim to corroborate this by varying the 
number of contingency pairings to be learned (e.g., three vs. nine word-colour pairs). Future 
work might also attempt to assess whether the strength of the contingencies involved in the task 
moderates the role of contingency awareness in learning effects. In the present experiments, the 
contingencies were quite strong (i.e., words were 80% predictive of the response). With much 
weaker contingencies (e.g., 50%) participants might be less inclined to use conscious 
contingency knowledge to anticipate responses, as distracting words would much less frequently 
predict the correct response. We propose that contingency knowledge is only beneficial to the 
extent that it is accurately predictive of behaviour. If the contingencies to be learned are too 
complex, then predictions are likely to be incorrect. Similarly, if false contingency information is 
instructed (e.g., Experiment 3), then response predictions will also be wrong. 
 Further support for this notion comes from work on learning goals. Using the highly 
simplistic colour-word contingency learning paradigm, Schmidt and De Houwer (2012a) gave 
half the participants the goal to learn contingencies (i.e., they were not told the actual pairings, 
but asked to discover them). These participants showed a larger contingency effect than controls. 
Similar goal instructions in more complicated paradigms, such as artificial grammar learning 
(Reber, 1967), reveal the reverse result. That is, participants given the goal to learn an artificial 
grammar demonstrated worse grammar learning than control participants. In this more 
complicated task, we suggest that explicit attempts to predict responses will fail, interfering with 
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otherwise-implicit learning effects (for neurological support of this idea see Lieberman, 
Chang, Chiao, Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004). The colour-word contingency learning task, 
however, is simple enough that response prediction is successful, thus boosting the effect. 
 The idea that increased difficulty impairs the ability of explicit knowledge to benefit 
learning is also highly consistent with our episodic account. If the benefit of contingency 
awareness is that participants use their knowledge of contingencies to more strongly encode the 
high contingency responses, then this will only aid subsequent retrieval to the extent that 
participants know the contingencies correctly. If the contingencies are too complex, then 
participants are likely to have false theories about the relationships between stimuli and 
responses. Thus, the wrong relations will be encoded more strongly (e.g., as the errors of 
Experiment 3 in Reanalysis 1 suggest), thus diluting the true contingency effect. 
 In summary, our paper shows that contingency knowledge can have an effect on the size 
of the learning effect in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm. This knowledge seems 
to moderate the strength of implicit learning rather than being used in a direct, intentional 
manner. Indeed, the time that a participant has to use contingency knowledge between the onset 
of the stimulus and the response is so short that strategic use seems unlikely. It is therefore 
interesting that contingency awareness has an effect on performance at all. Our proposed 
episodic account of contingency learning effects, however, provides an integrative account of our 
results and other findings in the literature by proposing that explicit knowledge has an effect on 
performance by influencing how information is encoded into episodes, which then has an impact 
on subsequent retrieval. 
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Footnotes 
1
 The error and response latency data were combined in this way in order to simplify the 
reporting of the data. Separate analyses on errors and response latencies parallel the results 
with a single principle component. 
2
 Considering the distinction between high, instructed, and low contingency trials (i.e., as per 
Reanalysis 1) would similarly lead to a prohibitively small number of trials in the instructed 
and low contingency cells. Indeed, 9 of the 25 instructed participants did not have 
observations in all cells. Though not reported, analysis of the remaining 16 participants 
provides no different results than what we report below. 
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 Figures 
Figure 1. Experiment 1 (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of 
contingency and instruction group. The bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of 
contingency and subjective awareness. The bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 3. Experiment 3 (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of 
contingency and instruction group. The bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 4. Experiment 3 (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of 
contingency and subjective awareness. The bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 5. Reanalysis 1 (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of 
contingency type. The bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 6. Reanalysis 2 time series response latency data for (a) Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2, 
and (c) Experiment 3. 
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